The Legal Characterization of Lethal Autonomous Maritime Systems: Warship, Torpedo, or Naval Mine? by Nasu, Hitoshi & Letts, David
  
 
Published by the Stockton Center for International Law 
ISSN 2375-2831 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Legal Characterization of 
Lethal Autonomous Maritime Systems: 
Warship, Torpedo, or Naval Mine? 
 
 
 
 
Hitoshi Nasu and David Letts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
96 INT’L L. STUD. 79 (2020) 
 
 
 
 
Volume 96    2020 
International Law Studies
Published Since 1895
 
 
 
Legal Characterization of LAMS Vol. 96 
79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Legal Characterization of 
Lethal Autonomous Maritime Systems: 
Warship, Torpedo, or Naval Mine? 
 
 
Hitoshi Nasu* and David Letts** 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
I.	 Introduction ................................................................................................ 80	
II.	 Legal Framework for Regulating the Use of Lethal Autonomous 
Maritime Systems (LAMS) ....................................................................... 83	
A.  Warship ................................................................................................. 84	
B.  Torpedo ................................................................................................. 87	
C.  Naval Mine ........................................................................................... 88	
III.	 Legal Implications of Each Characterization ........................................ 90	
A.		Navigational Rights ............................................................................. 91	
B.		Belligerent Rights ................................................................................. 94	
IV.	 Conclusion .................................................................................................. 95	
 
 
  
                                                                                                                  
* Professor of International Law, University of Exeter. 
** Associate Professor, Australian National University College of Law. This article is 
partly based on the presentation and discussion at the U.S. Consultative Meeting for the 
Revision of the San Remo Manual Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, hosted by the 
Stockton Center for International Law at the U.S. Naval War College, December 16–18, 
2019. We thank the participants of the meeting for informative discussion. 
The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those 
of the U.S. government, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or the U.S. Naval War College. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
80 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
T
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n August 2019, the Group of Governmental Experts of the High Con-
tracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons1 con-
cluded its deliberation on lethal autonomous weapons systems, deciding 
that “[t]he potential use of weapons systems based on emerging technolo-
gies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems must be conducted 
in accordance with applicable international law, in particular IHL [interna-
tional humanitarian law] and its requirements and principles, including inter 
alia distinction, proportionality and precautions in attack.”2 While this 
statement does not limit the geographical scope of its application, the regu-
lation of lethal autonomous maritime systems (LAMS) requires special con-
sideration under the specialized legal regime that governs naval warfare.3 
Naval warfare focuses primarily on the act of violence against objects 
and platforms, rather than individuals. As an advanced type of unmanned 
maritime systems, the autonomous lethality of LAMS—primarily the ability 
to navigate independently and damage or destroy an object—must be con-
sidered to address a different set of concerns unique to the maritime envi-
ronment and the specialized legal regime applicable to it. 
The use of unmanned systems has a long history in the maritime con-
text. “Fireships,” vessels filled with gunpowder, set ablaze, and then left to 
drift into enemy formations, are an ancient technique used in pre-modern 
naval warfare.4 Self-propelled and self-guided underwater explosive devices 
(torpedoes) emerged in the mid-nineteenth century, with the employment 
of various configurations during the 1854–56 Crimean War and the 1860–
65 U.S. Civil War. Most notably, W.B. Cushing of the U.S. Navy employed 
                                                                                                                  
1. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, Apr. 10, 1981, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137. 
2. Draft Report of the 2019 Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on 
Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems ¶ 17(a), 
U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2019/CRP.1/Rev.2 (Aug. 21, 2019); see also Report of the 2018 
Session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems ¶ 26(g), U.N. Doc. CCW/GGE.1/2018/3 (Oct. 
23, 2018). 
3. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49(3), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
4. 3 ALEXANDER GILLESPIE, A HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF WAR 27 (2011). 
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spar-mounted torpedoes in the sinking of the Confederate ram CSS Albe-
marle at Plymouth, North Carolina in October 1864.5 Following the U.S. 
Civil War, this progression continued and the first naval torpedo station 
was established at Newport, Rhode Island in 1869. 
This period also saw the emergence and use of automatic contact 
mines. The extensive and unrestricted use of such mines in the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904–05 prompted the adoption of the 1907 Hague Con-
vention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Mines6 
(Hague VIII) to protect commercial shipping from the indiscriminate ef-
fects of naval mines.7 With the advancement of technology, various types 
of unmanned underwater vehicles have been developed and employed for a 
variety of military purposes.8 While the majority of unmanned vehicles re-
main tethered to a surface ship and are remotely controlled, the application 
of artificial intelligence technology edges closer to the development of fully 
autonomous underwater vehicles with the adaptive ability to make inde-
pendent decisions regarding navigation, detection, the assessment of poten-
tial threats, and engagement in belligerent acts.9 
                                                                                                                  
5. Using a “ram” to attempt to sink or disable a vessel was a feature of naval warfare 
for many centuries. During the American Civil War, a number of vessels, such as the Al-
bemarle, were built as rams and used to varying effect in naval battles that took place in that 
conflict. See HOWARD J. FULLER, CLAD IN IRON: THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF BRITISH NAVAL POWER 195 (2008) (discussing “ram fever”). For a de-
scription of the attack on the Albemarle by Cushing, see IVAN MUSCIANT, DIVIDED WA-
TERS: THE NAVAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 418–21 (1995). 
6. Convention VIII relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2332 [hereinafter Hague VIII]. 
7. GILLESPIE, supra note 4, at 28; INTERNATIONAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT WORK-
SHOP SUMMARY, CHATHAM HOUSE, INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO NAVAL 
MINES (2014) 2. 
8. See RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL45757, NAVY LARGE UN-
MANNED SURFACE AND UNDERSEA VEHICLES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CON-
GRESS (2019); Natalie Klein, Maritime Autonomous Vehicles within the International Law Frame-
work to Enhance Maritime Security, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 244 (2019); Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg, Unmanned Maritime Systems: Does the Increasing Use of Naval Weapon 
Systems Present a Challenge for IHL?, in DEHUMANIZATION OF WARFARE 119 (Wolff 
Heintschel von Heinegg et al. eds., 2018); Michael N. Schmitt & David S. Goddard, Inter-
national Law and the Military Use of Unmanned Maritime Systems, 98 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 
OF THE RED CROSS 567 (2017). 
9. It has been reported that the People’s Republic of China has deployed two HSU-
001 autonomous submarines for underwater surveillance and, in February 2019, Boeing 
was granted a contract to build four Orca autonomous vehicles for the U.S. Navy. See 
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With the prospect of LAMS entering military service in the near future, 
there is an urgent need to determine the legal classification of these sys-
tems. One possibility is to characterize LAMS as warships in order to assert 
legal entitlement to navigational rights under the law of the sea, coupled 
with the ability to exercise belligerent rights during an international armed 
conflict.10 Alternatively, LAMS may be characterized as torpedoes or naval 
mines, in which case various obligations and requirements under the law of 
naval warfare might restrict their development and use. 
An application of relevant legal regimes to accommodate LAMS by ref-
erence to the function these vehicles are intended to serve may go some 
way to regulate the use of unmanned maritime systems within the existing 
legal framework. However, difficulties arise when multiple functions merge 
in the form of LAMS possessing the dual autonomous abilities to navigate 
and detonate itself as an explosive device. 
With the focus on LAMS as sui generis hybrid weapon systems, this arti-
cle examines the legal implications of designation as a warship, torpedo, or 
naval mine under the applicable rules of international law for each. The 
legal status of LAMS ultimately depends on how States characterize LAMS 
and to what extent other States share that characterization, such that gen-
eral agreement is reached. Accordingly, this article does not adopt or advo-
cate for a particular position; rather, it articulates the legal implications of 
deploying LAMS under each of the legal regimes mentioned above. 
To that end, Part II reviews the legal status of warships, torpedoes, and 
naval mines as a potential legal framework for the regulation of LAMS. 
Next, Part III discusses the implications for the lawfulness of conduct in-
volving the use of LAMS, with specific consideration of navigational rights 
in peacetime and belligerent rights in the conduct of hostilities during an 
international armed conflict. Part IV concludes by identifying key consider-
ations that should guide each State in assessing the strategic and national 
interests served by characterizing LAMS under the respective legal regimes 
and in resolving disagreement over the legal characterization of LAMS. 
 
                                                                                                                  
Sebastien Roblin, The U.S. Navy Has Orca Robot Submarines on the Way that Could Transform 
Naval Warfare, THE NATIONAL INTEREST, Oct. 20, 2019. 
10. Difference of opinion exists regarding the application of the “doctrine of belliger-
ency” in non-international armed conflict. See, for example, the discussion on this topic in 
Phillip J. Drew, Blockade? A Legal Assessment of the Maritime Interdiction of Yemen’s Ports, 24 
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 35, 39 (2019). 
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II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING THE USE OF LETHAL              
AUTONOMOUS MARITIME SYSTEMS 
 
Currently, there is no specific rule of international law that regulates the 
development, acquisition, use, or transfer of LAMS. States, therefore, have 
largely unfettered freedom in developing, acquiring, using, or transferring a 
maritime unmanned system unless it qualifies as an object that is accorded 
legal status for the specific purpose of regulation under the relevant rules 
of international law. For example, the 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) regulates specific types of maritime objects, such as 
“ships,”11 “installations and structures,”12 and “submarine cables and pipe-
lines,”13 primarily to establish the conditions under which a State is entitled 
to exercise jurisdiction over those objects or grant them jurisdictional im-
munities. Thus, certain entitlements attach to LAMS to the extent they 
qualify, for example, as ships or installations and structures over which a 
State exercises jurisdiction or, provided certain conditions are met, for 
which the State may claim jurisdictional immunities.14 
Alternatively, obligations may arise to conduct a legal review of weap-
ons as a means of warfare to ensure compliance with a specific treaty pro-
hibiting or restricting the use of a certain weapon, if LAMS fall within the 
scope of such regulation.15 More generally, States that are party to Addi-
tional Protocol I would be required to conduct a weapons review if LAMS 
are characterized as a “weapon, means or method of warfare.”16 Additional 
considerations arise, and certain obligations may be imposed on the use of 
                                                                                                                  
11. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 17–32, 90–97, Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
12. Id. arts. 60, 80. 
13. Id. arts. 79, 112–15. 
14. See Schmitt & Goddard, supra note 8, at 575–77. 
15. See WILLIAM H. BOOTHBY, WEAPONS AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 342 
(2d ed. 2016). 
16. Additional Protocol I, supra note 3, art. 36. For differences between the weapons 
review obligation under Article 36 of Additional Protocol I and under customary interna-
tional law, see Damian P. Copeland, Legal Review of New Technology Weapons, in NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 43, 47–52 (Hitoshi Nasu & Robert 
McLaughlin eds., 2014). On the customary international law status of Article 36, see Natalia 
Jevlevskaja, Weapons Review Obligation under Customary International Law, 94 INTERNATIONAL 
LAW STUDIES 186 (2018). 
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LAMS, if, and to the extent, they qualify as “vessels” as defined by regula-
tions for preventing collisions at sea.17 
In an attempt to resolve some of these issues, the International Mari-
time Organization (IMO) is currently undertaking a scoping exercise to de-
termine how marine autonomous surface ships should be regulated to en-
sure that trials of related systems and infrastructure are conducted safely, 
securely, and with due regard for the protection of the environment.18 
While this effort is moving towards integrating autonomous ships into one 
element of the existing regulatory framework, the scope of application is 
limited to specific areas of maritime safety and environmental protection.19 
The IMO’s readiness to embrace different degrees of autonomy for en-
suring maritime safety is not indicative of a general agreement among 
States regarding the legal characterization of unmanned maritime systems. 
At best, it is only inchoate evidence of State practice under customary in-
ternational law. In the absence of a general definition of a ship, the follow-
ing analysis focuses on the potential legal arguments supporting the classi-
fication of LAMS as warships, torpedoes, or naval mines, as these terms are 
defined under the respective legal regimes. 
 
A. Warship 
 
Drafted between 1973 and 1982, and often referred to as a constitution for 
the oceans, UNCLOS came into force in 1994. It defines a warship as: 
 
[a] ship belonging to the armed forces of a State bearing the external 
marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality, under the command of 
an officer duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose 
                                                                                                                  
17. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 
Oct. 20, 1972, 28 U.S.T. 3459, T.I.A.S. No. 8587, 1050 U.N.T.S. 16. The Convention de-
fines “vessel” as “every description of water craft, including non-displacement craft and 
seaplanes, used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water.” Id. r. 3(a). 
Accordingly, one may question whether maritime unmanned systems used solely for intel-
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, while ill equipped for transportation, must com-
ply with the Convention. 
18. See International Maritime Organization [IMO], MSC.1/Circ.1604, Interim Guidelines for 
MASS [Marine Autonomous Surface Ships] Trials (June 14, 2019), https://www.register-
iri.com/wp-content/uploads/MSC.1-Circ.1604.pdf. 
19. For a list of conventions and legal instruments covered in this scoping exercise, 
see In Focus: Autonomous Shipping, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION [IMO], 
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/Pages/Autonomous-shipping.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020). 
 
 
 
Legal Characterization of LAMS Vol. 96 
85 
 
 
 
 
 
 
name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent, and manned 
by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline.20 
 
This definition is derived from the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High 
Seas,21 which in turn relied upon the definition used in the 1907 Hague 
Convention VII relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-
Ships.22 The term warship includes submarines and surface ships, as well as 
Coast Guard vessels that belong to the armed forces of the State.23 
A plain language interpretation of the UNCLOS definition suggests 
that LAMS are precluded from having the legal status of warships because 
there is no duly commissioned officer authorized to take command or a 
crew physically present on board.24 However, this definition originated to 
codify the conditions for the conversion of a merchant ship into a war-
ship.25 Once converted, the vessel was entitled to all the privileges associat-
ed with a warship, including the exercise of belligerent rights. The convert-
ed ships also became subject to restrictions imposed by neutral States un-
der customary international law arising from State practice during the latter 
half of the nineteenth century.26 
There is no evidence to indicate that when the definition of warship 
was developed in 1907 the drafters of the Convention, or the States they 
represented, intended to prevent unmanned maritime systems developed 
and employed for military purposes from characterization as warships. Ra-
ther, the issue simply did not arise, as the technology at the time obviously 
did not contemplate anything other than manned warships. 
The legal status of LAMS under customary international law will re-
main unsettled until relevant State practice develops into an extensive, 
widespread, and virtually uniform position to support or deny their status 
                                                                                                                  
20. UNCLOS, supra note 11, art. 29. 
21. Convention on the High Seas art. 8(2), Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. 
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11. 
22. Convention VII relating to the Conversion of Merchant Ships into War-Ships 
arts. 1–4, Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319 [hereinafter Hague VII]. 
23. SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CON-
FLICTS AT SEA 90 (Louise Doswald-Beck ed., 1995) [hereinafter SAN REMO MANUAL]. 
24. See, e.g., Schmitt & Goddard, supra note 8, at 579; Robert McLaughlin, Unmanned 
Naval Vehicles and the Law of Naval Warfare, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT, supra note 16, at 229, 238–40. 
25. A. PEARCE HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCES CONCERNING THE LAWS AND USAGES OF WAR: TEXTS OF CON-
VENTIONS WITH COMMENTARIES 312–15 (1909); see also Hague VII, supra note 22. 
26. HIGGINS, supra note 25, at 312–15. 
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as warships.27 Of course, a treaty with sufficient State participation defining 
their status would settle the question. However, given the paucity of suc-
cessfully negotiated treaties addressing naval warfare since the 1907 Hague 
Conventions such a decisive outcome appears unlikely. 
During this period of uncertainty, a State may adopt its own views on 
the legal status of LAMS under customary international law, or define 
LAMS as warships based on policy considerations regarding the strategic, 
political, and legal consequences of doing so.28 Alternatively, a State may 
adopt a normative approach by proposing a contextual assessment, as 
Judge Yusuf did in the Jurisdictional Immunities case,29 particularly in light of 
the UNCLOS objective to promote the peaceful uses of the seas and 
oceans.30 This normative perspective may carry greater weight as the num-
ber of LAMS deployed, and the ease of their production and operation, 
create a viable threat to freedom of navigation for merchant vessels. 
The legal status of warships, as distinct from other governmental ships, 
carries particular significance during an international armed conflict in that 
only warships are entitled to exercise belligerent rights. Without that enti-
tlement, LAMS can be legitimately employed only when launched from a 
warship that retains sufficient control over the LAMS to facilitate the exer-
cise of belligerent rights, for example, as a means to maintain and enforce a 
naval blockade.31 The use of autonomous functions resulting in destruction 
or damage to objects or death or injury of persons would otherwise be re-
stricted to situations of self-defense. Therefore, LAMS would lose much of 
their strategic and tactical value if States treated the platforms merely as 
ships, but not warships, without any independent entitlement to exercise 
belligerent rights. 
 
                                                                                                                  
27. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (F.R.G. v. It.; Greece intervening), Judg-
ment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, ¶¶ 83–84 (Feb. 3); North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den., 
F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Report 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 
Judgment, 1951 I.C.J. Rep. 116, 131 (Dec. 18); Asylum (Colom. v. Peru), Judgment, 1950 
I.C.J. Rep. 266, 276 (Nov. 20). 
28. See infra Part III. 
29. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (F.R.G. v. It.; Greece intervening), Judg-
ment, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. 99, 298, ¶¶ 26–36 (Feb. 3) (dissenting opinion by Yusuf, J.) (advo-
cating for the consideration of normative values from human rights or humanitarian law in 
assessing the scope and extent of State immunity under customary international law when 
the issue remains uncertain and unsettled). 
30. UNCLOS, supra note 11, pmbl. ¶ 4, arts. 88, 301. 
31. Schmitt & Goddard, supra note 8, at 581–82. 
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B. Torpedo 
 
One of the key advantages of a torpedo is that it can be launched from a 
variety of platforms with the potential of devastating effect upon even the 
largest of vessels. In today’s navies, many classes of surface vessels, as well 
as submarines and aircraft, carry torpedoes. Torpedoes are one of the sub-
marine’s primary weapons, but they also can be dropped from fixed- and 
rotary-wing aircraft. The greatest use of torpedoes in hostilities occurred 
during World War II, when the torpedo proved to be a highly versatile 
weapon.32 
Hague VIII prohibits the use torpedoes that do not become harmless 
when they have missed their target.33 In practice, this has meant that torpe-
does must sink or otherwise become harmless when they have run their 
course.34 The rule prevents torpedoes from becoming a hazard to vessels 
exempted from attacks,35 consistent with the general principle of distinc-
tion that is applicable in armed conflict.36 Moreover, belligerents are re-
quired to employ torpedoes in conformity with various rules of targeting 
that apply in naval warfare.37 
During the drafting of Hague VIII, there was little discussion of torpe-
does except to distinguish them from naval mines.38 Technological capabili-
ties drove the distinction. Torpedoes could be made harmless after they 
                                                                                                                  
32. For example, the U.S. Navy fired approximately 14,750 torpedoes from subma-
rines during World War II, which sank 1,314 ships and accounted for 55 percent of Japa-
nese shipping losses. See E.W. JOLIE, NAVAL UNDERWATER SYSTEMS CENTER TECH-
NICAL DOCUMENT 5436, A BRIEF HISTORY OF U.S. NAVY TORPEDO DEVELOPMENT 44 
(1978), http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2015/ph241/hernandez2/docs/TorpDevel-
Usn-JolieNusc1978.pdf. 
33. Hague VIII, supra note 6, art. 1(3). 
34. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 23, r. 79. 
35. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL § 13.12 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANU-
AL]; U.S. NAVY, U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCTP 11-
10B/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS § 9.4 (2017) [hereinafter U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]; SAN REMO 
MANUAL, supra note 23, ¶ 79.2. 
36. DANISH MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, MILITARY MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
RELEVANT TO DANISH ARMED FORCES IN INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS 363 (2016); 
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (GERMANY), ZDV 15/2, LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 
MANUAL §1052 (2013). 
37. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 23, rr. 38–46. 
38. HIGGINS, supra note 25, at 328. There is only one reference to torpedoes in Hague 
VIII. See Hague VIII, supra note 6, art. 1(3). 
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missed their target, whereas anchored floating mines remained dangerous 
for an indefinite period.39 With modern advancements in sensors and pro-
pulsion, much of the functional traits that distinguished torpedoes from 
naval mines have lost their legal significance. For example, the U.S. Navy 
deployed the CAPTOR mine, which launched a torpedo targeting a hostile 
submarine upon detecting its acoustic signature,40 and now employs the 
Submarine Launched Mobile Mine, which navigates itself to a predeter-
mined location to await a specified surface target.41 Modern arrays of tor-
pedoes are increasingly equipped with advanced technologies such as sonar 
seekers, wire-control systems, and magnetic field sensing to detect and pur-
sue identified targets with greater precision.42 
In the absence of a legal definition of torpedo, questions may arise as 
to whether unmanned maritime systems armed with warheads and the abil-
ity to detect and attack identified targets, qualify as torpedoes, requiring 
them either to sink or become harmless when they have missed their target 
or run their course. The design intent will likely determine the answer; 
LAMS are likely to be designated as torpedoes when they are intended for a 
one-off use, whereas such designation would not be warranted if they are 
recoverable and allow for multiple uses. However, a teleological interpreta-
tion could expand the scope of this rule because even recoverable un-
manned maritime vehicles may pose hazardous risks to innocent vessels. In 
cases where LAMS are equipped with self-guiding navigation systems, un-
certainty would arise regarding the point at which they would be consid-
ered to have missed their target or completed their run. 
 
C. Naval Mine 
 
The use of an explosive or incendiary device to attack ships at sea has been 
a feature of naval warfare for thousands of years, however, the develop-
ment of a weapon that can be said to have many of the same characteristics 
                                                                                                                  
39. HIGGINS, supra note 25, at 337. 
40. MK [Mark] 60 Encapsulated Torpedo (CAPTOR), GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/munitions/mk60.htm (last visited Apr. 
14, 2020). 
41. MK [Mark] 67 Submarine Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM), FEDERATION OF AMERI-
CAN SCIENTISTS: MILITARY ANALYSIS NETWORK, https://fas.org/man/dod-
101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-67.htm (last updated Dec. 12, 1998). 
42. See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 2000, AN ASSESSMENT OF UNDERWA-
TER WEAPONS SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 15–16 (2000). 
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of the modern naval mine only emerged in the nineteenth century.43 Since 
that time, many States have produced large quantities of naval mines. Naval 
mines feature various types and characteristics, including the technological-
ly simple contact mine—a mine containing high explosives that detonates 
on contact with a vessel—and more advanced mines that detonate follow-
ing the recognition of an acoustic, magnetic, or seismic pressure signature.44 
The primary focus of Hague VIII is the regulation of one type of naval 
mine—the automatic submarine contact mine—and, through the regula-
tion of that mine, to ensure as far as possible, peaceful and secure naviga-
tion for vessels not engaged in an armed conflict.45 The Convention re-
quires States to maintain effective control over naval mines to prevent haz-
ardous risks to commercial shipping. It prohibits the use of unanchored, 
free-floating mines unless they are directed against military objectives and 
constructed to become harmless as soon as control over them is lost.46 The 
employment of naval mines must also conform to the rules of targeting in 
naval warfare, including the duty to exercise every possible precaution not 
to interfere with commercial shipping, and the recording and notification 
of danger zones.47 While Hague VIII itself is limited in scope to the type of 
naval mine in existence when the Convention was adopted, these basic re-
strictions have subsequently been applied more generally to regulate how 
all naval mines are employed in peacetime or during armed conflict.48 
                                                                                                                  
43. David Letts, Naval Mines: Legal Considerations in Armed Conflict and Peacetime, 98 IN-
TERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 543, 547 (2016); RICHARD DUNLEY, BRITAIN 
AND THE MINE 1900–1915: CULTURE, STRATEGY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2018); see 
generally MURRAY F. SUETER, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SUBMARINE BOAT, MINE AND 
TORPEDO FROM THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT TIME (2d ed. 1908). 
44. Letts, supra note 43, at 546. 
45. Hague VIII, supra note 6, pmbl. 
46. Id. art. 1. For a detailed analysis, see Steven Haines, 1907 Hague Convention VIII 
Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines, 90 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 
412, 422–25 (2014); C.H. Stockton, Submarine Mines and Torpedoes in Time of War, 2 AMERI-
CAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 276 (1908). 
47. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 23, rr. 80–91. 
48. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 215 (June 27); Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 
1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 19–22 (Apr. 9); U.S. DOD LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 35, 
§13.11; U.S. COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 35, §9.2; UNITED KINGDOM MINIS-
TRY OF DEFENCE, THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 
13.52–13.64 (2004); COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK: LEGAL BASES FOR THE OPERATIONS OF 
THE GERMAN NAVAL FORCES 185 (Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg & Hans-Joachim Un-
behau eds., 2004); SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 23, ¶ 79.2; see also Letts, supra note 43, 
at 549; Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The International Law of Mine Warfare at Sea, in THE 
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Due to technological advances and accompanying State practice, the 
definitional restriction of naval mines subject to Hague VIII has lost much 
of its legal significance. Instead, certain underlying principles guide the legal 
assessment of the wide-ranging types of mines developed in the succeeding 
years. The regulations governing naval mines are now a composite legal 
regime under which a variety of customary international law rules and trea-
ty instruments apply.49 Thus, the San Remo Manual defines mines broadly as 
an “explosive device laid in the water, on the sea-bed or in the subsoil 
thereof, with the intention of damaging or sinking ships or of deterring 
ships from entering an area.”50 
Under this composite regime, the basis for the legal regulation of naval 
mines is not the characteristics of the weapon system itself, but rather how 
militaries employ the weapon. It is uncertain, however, whether this ap-
proach extends to a maritime platform that integrates explosives such that 
the platform itself becomes a weapon system. Further, when assessing the 
adequacy of this approach to classify LAMS, one must consider the legal 
implications of extending the regime governing naval mines to a new gen-
eration of maritime platforms with autonomous lethal capability. 
 
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF EACH CHARACTERIZATION 
 
As discussed above, the legal characterization of LAMS determines which 
body of international law applies to regulate their legal status and the man-
ner in which they can be used in peacetime and during armed conflict. This 
characterization has significant implications on the lawfulness of conduct 
involving, or in relation to, the use of LAMS under specific circumstances. 
An illustrative example is the Chinese Navy’s seizure of a U.S. un-
manned underwater vehicle (UUV) as the USNS Bowditch, a U.S. govern-
ment vessel, was recovering the UUV in the South China Sea.51 The UUV 
was one of two ocean gliders that the Bowditch was recovering at the time of 
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the seizure; therefore, it was under the control of the U.S. vessel. Thus, it 
can be argued that this incident did not raise any question regarding the 
legal status of the glider or of the rights and obligations attached to it. Still, 
a question may be asked as to whether the UUV would have enjoyed sov-
ereign immunity as an item of equipment operating independently from a 
ship that was entitled to such status.52 In any event, the UUV was the 
property of the U.S. government. On that basis alone, China had no right 
to seize or retain the UUV, as regardless of the legal characterization of 
LAMS, the UUV would receive sovereign immunity when owned or oper-
ated by a government.53 
However, whether remotely controlled from a ship or operating auton-
omously, there is a need to consider the wider legal implications of a vehi-
cle’s status rather than simply its entitlement to sovereign immunity. As 
such, the following analysis considers LAMS’s entitlement to navigational 
rights in peacetime and belligerent rights during an armed conflict. 
 
A. Navigational Rights 
 
The choice between characterizing LAMS as warships or other means of 
naval warfare, such as torpedoes or naval mines, has significant implica-
tions for asserting navigational rights. The navigational rights of ships orig-
inate in medieval notions of the freedom of passage; today these rights are 
recognized in UNCLOS and under customary international law.54 
Depending on the maritime zone in which the passage is occurring, 
varying conditions attach to the right: innocent passage in the territorial sea 
and archipelagic waters of foreign States, transit passage through straits 
used for international navigation, archipelagic sea lanes passage, and free-
dom of navigation on the high seas.55 According LAMS the legal status of 
ships, even that of warships, means that they would be entitled to exercise 
those navigational rights. For example, Articles 17, 18, 19, and 52 of UN-
CLOS recognize the right of innocent passage, defined as a continuous and 
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expeditious traversing of the territorial sea or archipelagic waters in a man-
ner not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal or 
archipelagic State.56 Here, when LAMS are exercising this right in compli-
ance with the applicable law of the sea requirements, the coastal State may 
not prevent or interfere with their passage through its territorial or archipe-
lagic waters. 
The entitlement to navigational rights appears strategically advanta-
geous for those States with the capability to build and deploy LAMS on a 
large scale. However, each of the navigation regimes, particularly that of 
innocent passage as articulated in Article 19 of UNCLOS,57 is an outcome 
of negotiated compromises striking a balance between the navigational in-
terest of the maritime State and the protective interest of the coastal State.58 
The notion that LAMS are entitled to the right of innocent passage as a 
warship may not serve the interest of the coastal State and risks destabiliz-
ing the innocent passage regime. In this respect, consideration should be 
given to the fact that the claim of innocent passage by warships remains a 
contentious issue, with some States seeking to require prior notification or 
permission for the passage of warships.59 A unilateral attempt to expand 
the definition of warship to confer that status upon LAMS may trigger a 
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protective reaction by a greater number of coastal States, thus challenging 
navigational rights asserted by even those warships that fall squarely within 
the definition set forth in UNCLOS. 
In contrast, other means of warfare, such as torpedoes and naval 
mines, have no navigational rights. Quite the contrary, the presence of 
those weapons in the territorial sea without the consent of the coastal State 
would constitute a violation that State’s sovereignty. It could even consti-
tute an unlawful use of force if naval mines are present in such large num-
bers that the presence of these weapons becomes a mining operation.60 
The extent to which those weapon systems may enjoy freedom of nav-
igation on the high seas is also restricted by the requirement to exercise due 
regard for the interests of other States.61 The duty to notify other States, 
and therefore potentially affected shipping, of the presence of naval mines 
that creates a danger zone is compatible with the requirement of due re-
gard, but it does not bode well for the right of innocent passage. 
Disputes will arise when the coastal State does not accept the premise 
that LAMS are a type of warship, or indeed a ship of any description enti-
tled to the right of innocent passage. Given that LAMS are unmanned, the 
coastal State may decide to seize LAMS as a countermeasure against the 
infringement of their sovereignty. A State may even choose to destroy a 
particular system, justifying the action as a lawful exercise of self-defense. 
Finally, even if the legal characterization of LAMS as warships received 
widespread recognition, a coastal State might regard the passage of LAMS, 
due to their autonomous capability of initiating lethal attacks, as inherently 
prejudicial to its peace, good order, or security.62 In that situation, the 
coastal State may seek to invoke its right under Article 25 of UNCLOS to 
“take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is 
not innocent.”63 This response may be even more likely if the coastal State 
does not agree with the characterization of LAMS as warships. 
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B. Belligerent Rights 
 
Beyond the strategic advantages of characterizing LAMS as warships, naval 
powers may also see tactical advantages to this characterization, as it would 
enable LAMS to exercise belligerent rights during an armed conflict. Bellig-
erent rights are derived from the legal status of a warship, as a form of the 
principle of distinction that distinguishes warships from other governmen-
tal and non-governmental vessels. In naval warfare, only warships are legal-
ly entitled to commit acts of violence against legitimate military targets, 
conduct visit and search of merchant vessels, and establish and enforce a 
naval blockade.64 LAMS could be an effective force multiplier in perform-
ing these functions, while providing these benefits at a reduced cost.65 
Moreover, deployed in large numbers, and because of their relatively small 
size, LAMS could provide commanders with the additional benefit of the 
element of surprise. Finally, characterizing LAMS as warships could expo-
nentially increase the number of maritime platforms legally entitled to exer-
cise the full range of belligerent rights. 
Even if characterized as warships, the exercise of belligerent rights by 
LAMS presents unique challenges. For example, LAMS could be required 
to determine the enemy character of merchant vessels that would make 
these vessels subject to attack or capture outside neutral waters. However, 
as a merchant vessel may not be an object of attack unless the vessel makes 
an effective contribution to military action, refuses an order to stop, or ac-
tively resists visit, search, or capture,66 questions arise regarding how LAMS 
would make these determinations or carry out those actions. 
Visit and search is also required before seizing an enemy merchant ves-
sel as prize when its nationality is uncertain.67 From a practical perspective, 
how do LAMS, which are, by definition, unmanned, conduct physical in-
spections of a ship? This requires LAMS be equipped with the capabilities 
necessary to engage in visit and search operations that go beyond autono-
mous detection and identification of legitimate military objectives based on 
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the characteristics of the vessel. When a physical inspection of a vessel is 
necessary, practical difficulties may preclude LAMS from characterization 
as warships or as vessels operating as such. 
On the other hand, if classified as a means of warfare, belligerent par-
ties may employ LAMS as they would any other weapon, that is, in con-
formity with the applicable rules of naval warfare. For example, employing 
LAMS to monitor shipping lanes used by both civilian vessels and enemy 
warships would be unlawful if the LAMS are incapable of directing attacks 
only against legitimate military objectives.68 
The establishment and enforcement of a naval blockade by LAMS 
alone may also be prohibited unless they can be employed in a manner that 
does not endanger legitimate commercial shipping.69 In contrast, warships 
are lawful maritime platforms for the launching of attacks or enforcing a 
naval blockade. Thus, unlike warships, the ability to lawfully employ LAMS 
characterized as a means of warfare would be more restricted since they 
would have no legal entitlement to exercise belligerent rights. 
The definitional uncertainty of the term warship is likely to lead to dis-
putes regarding the entitlement of LAMS to exercise belligerent rights. Bel-
ligerent parties that do not possess the capability to develop or deploy 
LAMS, as well as neutral States, may oppose the use of LAMS as inde-
pendent military platforms for the exercise of belligerent rights. Neutrals 
that take this position may deny passage of LAMS through their territorial 
sea, while allowing such passage for manned belligerent warships.70 
The strategic decision to characterize LAMS as warships will require 
States to contemplate the potential legal reaction of other States, as well as 
the availability of the technological capability necessary to implement the 
various legal obligations associated with that characterization. These con-
cerns will need to be weighed against the tactical advantages expected from 
the use of LAMS in place or in further support of traditional warships. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The legal regime governing the use of maritime platforms in peacetime and 
during armed conflict is premised on the functional distinction between 
warships as the means to project naval power and other naval weapons as 
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the means of warfare. However, the rapid development of autonomous 
navigation and artificial intelligence is likely to challenge this regime. 
Long-settled understandings of key legal concepts, such as the manned 
warship exercising navigational and belligerent rights, must now accommo-
date the new reality that naval technology will merge multiple functions in 
the form of LAMS. For example, LAMS will have the dual ability to navi-
gate autonomously and to self-detonate as an explosive device. The emer-
gence of LAMS as a sui generis hybrid weapon system will likely generate 
disagreement on their legal status and may fuel existing controversies, such 
as the entitlement of warships to exercise the right of innocent passage and 
the manner in which the effectiveness of a naval blockade is maintained. 
As this article has demonstrated, the designation of LAMS as a war-
ship, torpedo, or naval mine is inevitably associated with particular legal 
implications for the exercise of navigational rights in peacetime and bellig-
erent rights in the conduct of hostilities during armed conflict. These con-
siderations should guide each State in assessing the strategic and national 
interests served by characterizing LAMS according to their primary func-
tion, bearing in mind the potential risks of their misuse and unintended 
consequences. Moreover, the disagreement over the legal characterization 
of LAMS, particularly between naval powers and coastal States, will almost 
certainly demand a broader compromised solution at some future point. 
In our view, the key to that resolution is the identification of how 
LAMS may be employed without prejudice to the peace, good order, or 
security of coastal States and in conformity with the normative rationale 
underpinning the rules of naval warfare. For instance, coastal States may 
accept the innocent passage of LAMS if their autonomous targeting sys-
tems are inoperative. States with commercial shipping interests may accept 
the use of LAMS for visit and search if they can gather the information 
necessary to determine the belligerent nexus of merchant vessels and there 
are appropriate restrictions on the circumstances in which their targeting 
system can be engaged and their destructiveness. 
Reaching consensus on the legal characterization of LAMS is a pressing 
concern that State policymakers should treat as an urgent priority. Once 
LAMS have been developed and deployed, reaching agreement on restrict-
ing their use will be exceedingly more difficult. In addition to the costs as-
sociated with procurement, reconfiguration, and replacement, States have 
shown little appetite for refraining from using a weapon once its military 
value has been shown. Given the alarming pace at which autonomous nav-
igation and artificial intelligence technology are advancing, there is little 
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moment to spare in settling this pressing legal debate. The significance of 
strategic and operational implications of this debate is far too great to leave 
the issue unattended. 
 
